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2.1  Introduction 
The empirical literature on new goods has long shown an interest in the 
automobile. The hedonic approach was introduced to the profession in Court’s 
1939 attempt to measure  the evolution  of  automobile prices  on  a quality- 
adjusted basis. Griliches (1961), Triplett (1969), Ohta and Griliches (1976), 
and Gordon (1990, chap. 8), all leading references, continued the study of the 
industry. Yet each of these, only Court excepted, is focused on developments 
that took place in the years after the Great Depression, a period when the auto- 
mobile as an innovation was clearly mature. Recent research suggests that the 
largest contributions of new goods to welfare changes may well come much 
earlier on (Trajtenberg 1990). The industry’s annual model changes pose the 
price index question perfectly well in the postwar period. But the most salient 
questions about new goods necessarily take us further back in time. 
Straightforward  facts  about  the  history  of  automobile manufacturing  in 
America support this view. In the first three decades of this century, the indus- 
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try went from scarcely existing, insofar as Census of Manufacturers enumera- 
tors were concerned, to being in terms of  the value of  products  the  largest 
industry in the economy.’ Over the period  we  study  in this  paper,  the most 
casual observer can recognize how much the product changed. Manufacturing 
methods evolved equally dramatically. So too did market prices. In  1906, for 
example, there were no new automobiles for sale at a price equal to or below 
the gross national product (GNP) per capita at the time of $336 (U.S. Bureau 
of the Census 1976, series F2). In fact, the average price in our database for 
that year is nearly ten times that amount. By 1940, when our data end, a house- 
hold with a year’s GNP per capita to spend ($754) had a choice of fifty-nine 
different models, and the average price of cars on the market that year was only 
about twice that sum. 
The industry saw tremendous changes over this period as well. Indeed, con- 
trasted with the tight oligopoly and dull performance of the post-World  War 
I1 decades, the vibrancy of these early years is almost shocking. There was an 
early and well-organized  attempt at cartelization that failed. Entry eventually 
proceeded  at a breakneck pace. Attracted by the palpably vast opportunities, 
hundreds of new firms burst onto the scene every year, the total running to well 
in excess of a thousand. More than ten thousand distinct models were on offer 
at one time or  another. Intense competition  in price and quality persistently 
pushed price-performance  ratios to new lows. 
The consequences were far reaching. One advertising  slogan early in the 
period ran “One day, one dollar; one year, one Ford.” In the very beginning, 
automobiles  were  strictly playthings of  the rich. But well before  1940, cars 
were routinely purchased by ordinary working households. The consequences 
of this for American economic life were themselves pervasive and profound. 
At the turn of the century, even private urban transportation was often powered 
by horses. Roads were often dusty when dry and all but impassable when wet. 
But by 1940, the internal combustion engine ruled the road. Road-construction 
techniques were recognizably modern. All-weather paved roads existed all over 
the nation. Bedroom suburbs and even places of work and trade were located 
in areas where trains and trolleys did not run. The automobile was a new good 
with important consequences. 
There is a vast literature on the industry’s history.’ However, quite surpris- 
ingly, it contains  no systematic quantitative  analysis of  the period  in which 
most of the technical change happened. Price indexes would be a useful start. 
We proceed in steps. The first is simply to complement  the existing hedonic 
literature by pushing the span of its automobile quality-adjusted price calcula- 
tions backward to 1906, thus closing in on the birth of the industry and the 
product. These price indexes can be used for a variety of  purposes. We pro- 
pose a crude decomposition  of  the price change into product-  and process- 
I.  By value-added, it ranked 5th out of326 in 1929. Combining it with the Census’s automotive 
2. For a recent survey see Flink (1988). His bibliography  is extensive. 
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innovation components, identifying constant-quality price change with manu- 
facturing economies and quality change with design improvement. We also use 
our indexes for comparisons to hedonic price indexes for other industries at a 
comparably early stage of  the product life cycle and for comparisons to he- 
donic price indexes for this industry in the later periods previously studied. In 
particular, we couple our results to those of Gordon’s (1990)  analogous exercise 
for the post-World  War I1 period to consider the industry’s history in the long 
view. Finally, we assess several possible sources of bias in our results. 
The paper proceeds in six main parts. Section 2.2 is a technical introduction 
to the product. In section 2.3 we discuss the data. In section 2.4 we give prelim- 
inaries to the hedonic analysis and discuss the regressions. In section 2.5 we 
present the main results in terms of quality-adjusted price indexes and put them 
in the wider context. In section 2.6  we consider the seriousness of two potential 
sources of bias in the index numbers. Section 2.7 concludes the paper. 
2.2  Cars: A Technical Overview 
Automobiles are complex products, arguably the most complex consumer 
durable at the turn of  the century as well as now. This basic fact permeates 
our approach to measurement and hence to gathering data. We thus begin by 
recognizing that any design for a self-propelled land vehicle  must confront 
a series of  interrelated engineering problems. Any particular design (i.e., any 
particular vehicle a consumer might buy) represents a particular set of  solu- 
tions to these problems. 
The generic problems are simply stated. The first task is to generate power 
from the fuel in a sustainable fashion. Gasoline, for example, can be mixed 
with air and exploded in a controlled way in a confined space.3 If one wall of 
the space can move relative to the others, the kinetic energy of the explosion 
becomes  linear  motion.  This can  be  converted  into  rotary  motion  to  turn 
wheels, and the rotary motion will be smoother if the mixing and exploding 
go on in several sites in some staggered sequence. All the mechanical elements 
involved in creating and transforming the linear motions need to be kept lubri- 
cated and relatively cool. 
Since the car is heavy, especially when loaded with passengers, there is sub- 
stantial inertia to be overcome in starting forward motion. Connecting the ro- 
tating shaft to a device that gears up or down to various degrees the speed of 
rotation helps in accomplishing this4  It is convenient to allow the operator to 
3. Getting the power generation started poses some problems distinct from those of continuing 
it. The design of the valves letting the gases into, and eventually out of, the space is also a subject 
in itself. 
4.  Early automobile engines had a fairly flat torque curve. As engines became more efficient- 
in the engineer’s sense of generating more power per unit displacement-torque  curves became 
more peaked. The more this was so, the more convenient it was to operate the engine at a relatively 
steady pace irrespective of the speed at which one wanted the wheels to turn.This too made multi- 
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engage and disengage the entire gear mechanism from the engine from time to 
time. When this (clutch) mechanism is engaged, the rotary motion then needs 
to be transmitted to at least some subset of the wheels, and this in a fashion 
that allows the vehicle to  There must also be a steering mechanism to 
guide the turns and a braking system to slow or stop the vehicle as required. A 
body, with seats and upholstery, is essential to make the car useful, and there 
must be some system between the chassis frame and the wheels to mediate 
between irregularities in the road’s surface and irregularities in the ride. For 
this latter reason and others, it has also proved convenient to mount tires on 
the wheels. 
This functional description of a car touches on all the main mechanical sys- 
tems. They are many, and none is simple in itself. In choosing specific solutions 
to each of the individual problems, general strategies must be adopted (e.g., 
the gasoline engine rather than, say, the steam engine or the electric motor), as 
well as detailed specifications for each of them (e.g., the numbers of cylinders 
and their dimensions, the compression ratio, the operating temperature range, 
etc.). Overall performance will be sensitive to each solution and often also to 
the interactions between them. 
The potential for such system interaction is elaborate. It is not merely true, 
for example, that the systems making up the engine must be well adapted to 
one another: elements of the design of the entire power train and chassis may 
also be implicated. It is unfortunately very difficult to capture these interac- 
tions  in  summary variables. We  thus adopted the second-best procedure  of 
identifying the most important systems (from both engineering and manufac- 
turing perspectives) and seeking data on their attributes. Our data set com- 
prises roughly forty attributes representing the state of the systems. 
2.3  Data 
Computing quality-adjusted  price  indexes, even using  as undemanding  a 
method as the hedonic, requires large amounts of very detailed data. One needs 
prices and detailed attribute information for virtually all the different models 
marketed in each periods6  Studies such as this thus rest firmly on the breadth 
of their data. 
The primary source of most information about the identities and systems of 
individual models that covers any wide range of models is the set of specifica- 
tion tables published in the contemporary trade press at the time of the annual 
5.  When the vehicle turns,the inner and outer wheels cover different distances. They therefore 
need to rotate at different rates. 
6. The more demanding methods, sketched in n. 13 below, are potentially more illuminating- 
for example, they can be used both to quantify welfare gains and to delineate their timing. The 
problem is that they require quantity data. that is, information on the quantities sold of each indi- 
vidual model in each year. No such database exists as of this writing. It is possible that one could 
be put together and coupled to the price and attribute data of this study. But doing this would be a 
major research enterprise in itself and was utterly beyond the scope of this paper. 75  Quality-Adjusted Automobile Prices 
Table 2.1  Manufacturers and Models 









































































Notes: The number given here for body models is the number for which we have data on price, 
wheelbase, and displacement. The number of body models in the underlying database is larger 
since in  some early years data on displacement was not consistently available. The  number of 
observations used in the regressions is slightly smaller since the regressions used only observations 
that also had complete information on the relevant systems. 
New York Auto Show.’ The trade journals vary in the attributes they report.8 
The attributes reported in each source also change slowly over time. The infor- 
mation given about some attributes is not as revealing as it might be.9 The 
tables are nonetheless very detailed and an extremely rich data source. 
Each mechanically distinct variant identified in the tables could usually be 
purchased with any of  several different bodies. We  call these pairings body 
models and use them as our unit of observation. We were constrained (by time 
and finances) to enter body-model data only for alternate years and to go back 
no further than  1906.’O Table 2.1 gives some basic descriptive statistics. We 
have a total of  over 11,OOO  observations (i.e., of  body models offered). The 
number rises sharply in the earliest years, more through entry than through 
model proliferation. It peaks in  1910 at 1,006. There is a second surge after 
7. Kimes and Clark (1985) gives somewhat more comprehensive coverage in its descriptive 
prose and images but not in its attribute descriptions. 
8. This may be sensitive to the balance between consumers, the retail and repair trade, and 
manufacturers and engineers in each periodical’s readership. 
9. For example, the tables may report manufacturer rather than design type. Or they may report 
design types, but in a way that blurs the distinction between minor and major variants. With suffi- 
cient background research, however, much of this can be rendered useful. 
10. Subsequent to the completion of this paper, we were able to extend the data set back to 
1901. We will exploit the new data in future work. 76  Daniel M. G.  Raff and Manuel Trajtenberg 
World War I and a third at the end of the 1920s, after which time the number 
declines considerably. There was a pronounced decline in the number of manu- 
facturers  over  the  whole period  and  substantial  model  proliferation  in  the 
1930s. 
Manufacturers  Body Models per Manufacturer 









After some research, we concluded that the attributes reported by the period- 
icals Automotive Industries and Motor together generally spanned the informa- 
tion available. We thus drew the data on attributes and prices from these peri- 
odicals.” Coverage was then compared against the listings in Kimes and Clark 
(19854, apparently the most authoritative hobbyist  source. Spot checks with 
other researchers and comparisons with industry histories and other such inves- 
tigations covering this period, published and otherwise, have revealed no im- 
portant or systematically unutilized information.l? It is important to note that 
our data represent  only firms  operating above  a certain  minimal  economic 
threshold, namely ones that were large enough to make advertising at the major 
annual trade show attractive. We may thus have left out experimentalists  and 
bespoke manufacturers  so aloof  from commerce that they  left customers to 
find their own way to the factory. We have surely left out some hopeful entre- 
preneurs who had and possibly even announced bold plans but never in fact 
made any cars. But we have found no evidence that we have left out any prod- 
ucts  that were actually  easy to buy,  and this is the breadth  of  data that  the 
hedonic method requires. 
2.4  Hedonic Analysis: Preliminaries 
The main goal of this paper is to construct price indexes that reflect as accu- 
rately as possible the vast improvements that took place in the design, manu- 
facturing, and performance  of cars during our chosen period. Given the fact 
that quantity data are unavailable, the only viable approach is to estimate he- 
donic price regressions  and compute on that basis quality-adjusted  price in- 
dexes. This has been the standard practice for the problem of  quality adjust- 
ment since Griliches (1961).” 
11. Our procedure was to code data on the selected attributes from the most comprehensive 
source of auto show mechanical-attribute tables available to us at the time of initial coding. We 
then went to that source’s body tables to create the fuller row  space in the identifier, price, and 
body-type columns and  then copied the mechanical-attribute data appropriately. We  then went 
to the other periodical’s tables and augmented as appropriate both the row  space of individual 
manufacturers’ body models and the column space of attributes we thought worth recording. 
12. The most notable unpublished source is Griliches and Ryan (1971). 
13. If we had possessed detailed quantity data, we would have estimated discrete-choice models 
of  demand, retrieved from them the underlying parameters of  a utility function  (it., marginal 
utilities of  the attributes of cars and of  income), and computed with the help of these welfare- 77  Quality-Adjusted Automobile Prices 
The hedonic approach has well-known  1imitati0ns.l~  The fact that the he- 
donic surface reflects neither utility nor supply but rather the tangency between 
the  two  restricts  the  extent  to  which  hedonic-based  price  indexes  can  be 
thought to capture fully the effects of  quality change. Hedonic methods are 
particularly  ill suited to periods of sharp change in technology (as might be 
reflected in shifts in the distribution of brands in attribute space). Nevertheless, 
hedonic quality-adjusted price indexes for cars during the first half of this cen- 
tury can significantly improve our knowledge of the evolution of this industry 
during its early  stages. Moreover,  since similar indexes  for the post-World 
War I1 period are available (e.g., Gordon  1990), we can put together a series 
of quality-adjusted prices almost a century long for one of the most important 
sectors of the economy. 
In this section we examine first the evolution of automobile prices over time 
(the dependent variable). We then consider the selection of attributes, that is, 
our explanatory variables. Finally, we present and discuss the estimates of he- 
donic price regressions from which our index number calculations derive. 
2.4.1  Evolution of Automobile Prices 
Since we study a relatively long period, the choice between using product 
prices  stated in current dollars or corrected for changes in the general price 
level may be an important one. During our period there were two major swings 
in the general price level, the  short but  sharp inflation  that followed World 
War I and the more familiar deflation that occurred at the onset of  the Great 
Depression. Prices in the post-World  War I1 period also had a complex history. 
Deflating raw prices by, for example, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) would 
control for this. Each series is illuminating in its own way. We present most of 
our results, here and later in the paper, in both ways. 
Figure 2.1 shows the time series of mean prices in our data set, stated in 
current dollars. The most striking feature is the size of the drop. Automobile 
prices fell by 5 1 percent, from $3,290 in 1906 to $1,611 in 1940. The CPI rose 
during the same period by 59 percent and hence inflation-adjusted  car prices 
dropped by  almost 70 percent. To give a better sense of what these numbers 
mean, figure 2.2 translates them into terms more meaningful to us: in  1993 
prices the average car offered in the 1906 market sold for $52,640; whereas by 
1940 the mean had dropped to $16,565 (not so far, incidentally, from the aver- 
age nominal price of  cars in 1993). This dramatic fall in prices is one of the 
single most important facts pertaining to the evolution of the automobile indus- 
try in its first half century, reflecting as it does both momentous technological 
advances and vast expansion of the market for automobiles. 
As with most developments in the history of the automobile, the price de- 
based price indexes. Trajtenberg (1990) and  Pakes, Berry, and Levinsohn (1993) illustrate the 
method. Such procedures obviate most of  the thorny problems that arise (see, e.g., section 2.6 
below) when using the hedonic method. 








1910  1920  1930  1940 
Fig. 2.1  Automobile prices 1906-1940  in current dollars 
cline was far from uniform  over time.  The largest part  of  the fall in  CPI- 
deflated prices occurred in two installments early in our period: from  1906 
through  1910 and from  1914 through  1918. In the course of the latter four 
years, the  CPI-deflated  price  of  cars shrank by  almost one-half  (from over 
$44,000 to $25,000 in  1993  dollar^).'^ From  1918 on there was for the most 
part a downward trend, but the overall drop was not nearly as dramatic as that 
of the earlier period. 
The rise in prices from 1910 to 1914 was associated with a large and wide- 
spread increase in the size and power of cars. Why precisely the big  1914-18 
decline occurred remains to be established. Recalling the dramatic introduc- 
tion of  mass-production methods at Ford at the end of calendar year 1913, it is 
tempting to attribute the subsequent sharp decline to Ford. Interpretive caution 
is in order here, however. Ford introduced mass production alone at first. There 
were very few different Ford models in those years. Ford cars therefore repre- 
sent a tiny percentage of  our sample. If  we had weighted  prices by  sales in 
calculating the series, then the price drop would be much more dramatic, and 
a big part of it would be  due to Ford. But our series was not generated in 
that way. It is possible that the course of the actual series owes to cross-price 
elasticities or to the discovery of  new  market niches. Tastes may  also have 
shifted downward in time of war. There certainly was a noteworthy downsizing 
of cars on the market, but what the cause of this was we cannot yet say. The 
subsequent secular decline of the series presumably has something to do with 
15. We  see here, for example, how  the information conveyed by looking at current prices is 
greatly distorted by the post-World  War I inflationary surge. Nominal prices were actually higher 
in 1920 than in  1906, but controlling for inflation reveals that prices had dropped by more than 
one-half! 79  Quality-Adjusted Automobile Prices 
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Fig. 2.2  Automobile prices 1906-1940  in constant 1993 dollars 
the diffusion of  mass-production methods across establishments, but that is 
a complex subject of its own (see Raff  199  1  and Bresnahan and Raff  199  1, 
1993). 
2.4.2  Selection of Attributes 
One fundamental  difficulty  has beset  all hedonic  car studies from Court 
(1939) onward. It is that of identifying a set of attributes that can be taken to 
be the most important performance attributes of cars and that can be measured 
in a consistent fashion over time. Only if quality in this sense is quite tightly 
controlled for can we begin to regard as reliable quality-adjusted price indexes 
based on hedonic regressions. 
Any quality-adjustment method requires regressors that would in principle 
go directly into a consumer’s utility  function. “Reliability,”  “smoothness of 
ride,” “safety,” “comfort,” and so forth, are presumably the sort of attributes in 
question. But these are extremely hard to quantify in an objective or even con- 
sistent manner. Engineering (i.e., technical) attributes are much easier to mea- 
sure, but they are certainly further removed from the quality dimensions per- 
ceived by consumers. 
The difficulty in identifying structural relationships between engineering at- 
tributes and utility  stems from the fact, sketched in  section 2.2 above, that 
for all their pervasiveness and ease of operation, cars are extremely complex 
machines. Their overall performance depends in a complicated way upon the 
performance of each of their systems, upon trade-offs made between systems, 
and upon the extent to which their design is well integrated. All this makes it 
a formidable  challenge to devise variables  that will even proxy  the perfor- 
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We have made some progress in that respect in this study by including (appar- 
ently for the first time) actual measures for many of those systems (brakes, 
clutch, drive mechanism, etc.). Whether our selection of  systems and variable 
definitions is the most appropriate or effective only further investigation  will 
reveal. 
In the end, we decided to include three categories of attributes in the hedonic 
regressions: measures of vehicle size, engine power, and the technology of five 
major engineering  systems.  Size and power  have been  used  in virtually  all 
automobile hedonics studies. They are very closely associated with price, and 
casual empiricism suggests that consumers do care about them. For systems, 
we initially attempted to cover all the major ones identified in section 2.2. In 
particular pairs of years, however, we often had to make significant compro- 
mises in the face of data limitations of various 
For size we use wheelbase, measured in inches."  For power we have avail- 
able for most years two alternative measures: rated horsepower (HP) and dis- 
placement. We opt for the latter whenever it is available because it captures 
more information (i.e., stroke, bore, and number of cylinders).'* The five sys- 
tems we chose are the rear axle, clutch, brakes, drive type, and suspension. 
The dummy variables are defined in table 2.2 with their names as they appear 
in the hedonic regression results later in the paper.19 
Each of these systems underwent dramatic changes over the period studied. 
Technical innovations, changes in demand, and the shifting interactions with 
related systems made particular designs emerge and diffuse, only to be super- 
seded later by others. The methods of this project require us to trace and grasp 
the evolution of system design over time, both in order to define the categories 
that eventually appear as dummy variables in the hedonic regressions and to 
form priors as to the likely signs of their coefficients. In addition, we believe 
that the time paths followed by competing designs are of significant interest in 
themselves. They show vividly the contest between alternative systems and the 
speed of diffusion of those that emerged as dominant. We present in the appen- 
dix a technical and graphical description of  the evolution of the main systems. 
If one of the types should become a virtual standard (i.e., if its share among 
the competing models approaches 100 percent), then it approaches collinearity 
with the regressions'  constant terms. The system can no longer be included in 
16. Some systems that clearly are important did not exhibit sufficient variation (because a cer- 
tain type was universally adopted very quickly). In other cases the qualitative categories reported 
in our sources were not consistent over time and hence could not be expressed across adjacent 
years as uniform dummy variables. 
17. The results are very similar if one uses weight instead. 
18. Rated HP is determined by  a formula that is not sensitive to important features of  engine 
design. In general, it is not the same as average or maximum HP. For the years 1906-10  we did 
not have consistent measures of displacement or its determinants and were obliged to use rated 
HP faute de mieux. We can observe that for the years for which we had both regressors, the results 
were not sensitive to which one we chose. 
19. In  the case of  each dummy, of  course, there is  a residual category. Thus, for example, 
RAXLESOF = I if the rear axle was half floating, RAXLESOF = 0 if it was of a different type. 81  Quality-Adjusted Automobile Prices 
Table 2.2  Systems Variable Definitions 
System  Variable 
Rear Axle  RAXLEF: rear axle of the fully floating type 
RAXLESOF:  rear  axle of  the  half-floating 
type 
Clutch  CLDISC: clutch using disc 
CLPLATE: clutch using plates 
CLSPLATE: clutch using a single plate 
Brakes  BRIHYDRA: internal hydraulic brakes 
Drive type  DRSBEVEL: drive, spiral bevel 
DRHYPOID: drive, hypoid 
Suspension (spring type)  SPHELLIP: spring, half-elliptic 
the regression. That is the case for the spring type from 1928 on, for example: 
the half-elliptical type had been adopted by then in over 95 percent of all cars 
marketed. In other cases, though, one type became dominant but then differen- 
tiated as subvariants appeared. In this case, the system can still be included: it 
merely requires a different dummy variable. For example, by  1928 the domi- 
nant clutch type was plate, but for a few years afterward the market split be- 
tween  single plate and double plate. In the case of the drive type, the spiral 
bevel acquired absolute dominance by  1922; but from 1926 on it had to com- 
pete against the hypoid type. By  1940 the latter was present in 80 percent of 
all models. 
2.4.3  Estimating Hedonic Regressions 
We  estimate  semilog  hedonic  regressions  using  both  current  and  CPI- 
deflated prices for every pair of adjacent years and include a dummy for the 
later year in the pair.2o  Tables 2.3-2.5  show the results. Since we are interested 
primarily in computing quality-adjusted price indexes, we content ourselves 
here with pointing out certain salient features of the regressions without ana- 
lyzing them in comprehensive detail. 
The coefficient of wheelbase is strikingly stable across most of the regres- 
sions, and strongly statistically significant throughout. The coefficient of dis- 
placement (i.e., power) is also quite steady during the  1920s, though it is less 
stable both before and after. The systems variables are for the most part sig- 
nificant, but aside from a few relatively short-lived instances (e.g., CLPLATE 
from 1914 to 1920), their coefficients vary a great deal.21 
Note that the R2 values are high and systematically increasing over time, 
rising from about .70 in the years 1910-20  to about .90 in the years 1930-40. 
20. Henceforth we refer to the coefficient on the dummy for the later year as the hedonic coeffi- 
cient. Recall that adjacent years in our database are in fact two years apart. 
21. We will not attempt to interpret the magnitudes of particular coefficients here. The literature 
appears to be divided on whether this is a useful activity; and  it would in any case require a 
technical discussion not germane to the goals of this section. Table 2.3  Hedonic Price Regressions for Automobiles (semilog) 1906-1920 































































































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
"Second-year dummy, current prices. 
bSecond-year dummy, constant (CPI-deflated) prices. Table 2.4  Hedonic Price Regressions for Automobiles (semilog) 1920-1930 
Variable  1920-22  1922-24  1924-26  1926-28  1928-30 
D-CURRENT'  -0.09 
(-5.0) 
D-CONSTANTb  -0.085 
(-4.5) 
WHEELBASE  0.05 
(25.0) 
DISPLACE  0.0007 
RAXLESOF  0.005 
(0.3) 




DRSBEVEL  0.16 
(3.2) 
SPHELLIP  -0.07 
(-3.6) 
R'  0.72 
MSE  0.099 

































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are r-statistics. 
'Second-year dummy, current prices. 
"Second-year dummy, constant (CPI-deflated) prices. 
Table 2.5 
Variable  1930-32  1932-34  1934-36  1936-38  1938-40 





























































































Nore: Numbers in parentheses are r-statistics. 
Second-year dummy, current prices. 
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Likewise, the mean square error (MSE) of the regressions systematically de- 
creases over time. This pattern may be seen more clearly in the course of the 
average MSE decade by decade: 
Decade  Average MSE 
1906-1 0  0.1100 
1910-20  0.0974 
1920-30  0.0798 
1930-40  0.0594 
It is thus quite evident that the fit of the hedonic regressions improves over 
time. It is not entirely clear why we should observe this pattern. One possible 
explanation is that the looser fit in the earlier years reflects greater technologi- 
cal heterogeneity and so a greater number of omitted aspects of quality. Subse- 
quent convergence toward  standard designs varying principally  only in size 
and power would by itself then lead to improving fit. It is also possible that 
with the increasing maturity  of  the market for automobiles, the preferences 
of  consumers  became  increasingly  well  defined  and  the  consumers  them- 
selves increasingly well informed. Both of these factors would have worked to 
force prices more and more into line with the observed attributes. It would be 
interesting to see whether the phenomenon of a tighter fit of the hedonic regres- 
sion as an industry evolves from infancy to maturity is also found in other 
markets. 
2.5  Quality-Adjusted Price Indexes 
In this section we compute quality-adjusted price indexes for automobiles, 
decompose them into two components corresponding to process and product 
innovation, and break down the entire period into more homogeneous subperi- 
ods. We  also compare  them to parallel  indexes  for computers.  Finally, we 
couple our series to Gordon’s (1  990) for the postwar decades so as to see the 
industry’s history whole. 
2.5.1  Simple Quality-Adjusted Price Indexes 
a quality-adjusted percentage price change as follows: 
On the basis of the hedonic coefficient, denoted hereafter by a,  we compute 
%AQAPrice = exp a -  1. 
Here QA stands for quality-adjusted, %A for percentage of change.’2 We calcu- 
late %AQAPrice both for a’s estimated on the basis of current prices and for 
a’s  estimated on the basis  of  CPI-deflated  prices. We  then  construct corre- 
sponding quality-adjusted price indexes with the results shown in table 2.6. 
22. Note that for small values of  a,  %AQAPrice = a.  But as a  grows larger in absolute value, 
so does the difference between (exp a -  I)  and a. 85  Quality-Adjusted  Automobile Prices 
Table 2.6  Quality-Adjusted  Price Indexes for Automobiles: 1906-1940 
Rate of  Change Using  Index Using 
Current  Constant  Current  Constant 






























































































Note: Constant prices are CPI-deflated (1993 = 100). 
The main findings are as follows. First, quality-adjusted prices (based on 
CPI-deflated prices) fell at an average rate of slightly more than 5 percent per 
year from 1906 to 1940, thus halving every thirteen years. This is by absolute 
standards quite a substantial pace. In terms of constant 1993 dollars, it means 
that the average price of a car of constant quality was $52,600 in 1906 and fell 
to just $8,100 by  1940. To put this in perspective, if the industry had continued 
to innovate at the same rate from 1944 to 1994, a car by then would have cost 
just $582 on a quality-adjusted basis. 
Second, as is to be expected, the rate of  change of quality-adjusted prices 
was generally larger in absolute value when we used CPI-deflated prices than 
when we used current prices. The exception is periods of marked deflation, 
during which automobile prices-like  the prices of many durables-dropped 
more slowly than the CPI.23  Third, we ran different variants of the hedonic 
regressions and constructed the corresponding indices in order to ascertain the 
role played by the inclusion of the variables representing the five engineering 
systems. The results (not shown in the tables) indicate that their inclusion does 
23.  Thus  in  1922 and  1932 the %AQAPrice based  on current prices  shows large declines 
whereas the %AQAPrice based on CPI-deflated prices either increases or shows no decline. The 
largest discrepancies between the two occurred  in  1918 and  1920 because of  the post-World 
War I inflation. 86  Daniel M. G. Raff and Manuel Trajtenberg 
make a difference, but for the most part it is a small one-in  the range of 0.5 
to 1.5 percentage points per year in the computation of %AQAPrice.?$ 
2.5.2  Process versus Product Innovation 
We next compute a rate of quality change, defined as a residual: 
%AQuality = %APrice -  %hQAPrice. 
If the attributes of cars remain constant, %APrice is exactly equal to %AQA- 
Price, and %AQuality must equal zero. Suppose, on the other hand, that cars 
improve. Then  %AQAPrice is strictly less than  %APrice. We  might call the 
difference-that  is, %AQuality-pure  quality change. If there is some techni- 
cal advance then this difference would be positive. (In this case %AQAPrice 
would be negative, since it refers to the quality-adjusted price decline.) Notice 
that ?hAQuality can take negative values if quality-adjusted prices drop less or 
rise more than unadjusted prices. That would be the case, for example, if prices 
did  not  change but  some cars displayed fewer of  some attributes  that  were 
positively  valued  (or, more precisely,  that  show a positive coefficient in the 
hedonic regression). 
The series is displayed in table 2.7. The 5 percent average annual decline of 
quality-adjusted  prices can be decomposed as follows. Prices by  themselves 
(CPI-defaulted) dropped at the rate of 3 percent per year. The residual “qual- 
ity” therefore increased at a rate of 2 percent. If  we identify constant-quality 
price change with manufacturing  economies and quality change, as we have 
defined it, with design improvements, then these numbers suggest that 60 per- 
cent of the decline in quality-adjusted prices was due to process innovation and 
only 40 percent was due to product innovation or quality change per se. 
This partition  of the overall quality-adjusted  price decline into a product- 
innovation and a process-innovation component should be regarded cautiously 
(see also Griliches 1961  ). Many  modern  manufacturing  economies, for ex- 
ample, come from simplifying designs (see, for example, Whitney  I988), and 
a reliable decomposition  would therefore have to study  specific innovations. 
And prices can certainly fall for a variety of  reasons, among them increased 
competition and lower input prices. But the identification with process innova- 
tion seems plausible because of the dramatic economies offered by the devel- 
opment and diffusion of mass-production methods. There can be no doubt that 
the set of techniques grouped under the umbrella term “mass production” con- 
stituted one of  the most important innovations in  manufacturing  methods of 
all time and had tremendous consequences in terms of unit costs, scale, and 
24. The one important exception is 1914-16. During that period there was a big drop in  prices 
(amounting to  -33  percent in CPI-deflated prices), but at the same time there was a significant 
downsizing of cars (i.e.. both mean wheelbase and power declined a great deal). As a result, the 
drop in quality-adjusted prices is less than that of unadjusted prices (-0.30  versus -0.33).  If one 
were to exclude wheelbase  and power from the regression, but  include the  systems, then  the 
quality-adjusted price decline jumps to -54  percent! 87  Quality-Adjusted Automobile Prices 
Table 2.7  Price and Quality Indexes for Automobiles (in constant 1993 dollars) 














































































































production  capabilities.  The drop from, say,  the $2,000-$3,000  cars of  the 
early years to the less-than-$500 Ford Model T would never have been possible 
with the craftlike  production  and assembly  methods that  prevailed early in 
the century. 
It remains to be established, however, precisely how much of the industry’s 
overall price drop can be attributed  to the diffusion  of mass production  and 
what exactly the causal link was. Casual evidence suggests that the relationship 
was very nonlinear, perhaps because of  the interplay between innovation and 
competition. Recall that prices dropped a great deal in the immediate aftermath 
of Ford’s introduction of mass production. Recall also that this was a period 
in which Ford was the only producer to operate in this fashion. We speculated 
above that the generalized drop was due to competitive pressures brought about 
by Ford’s drastic price reductions. That the downward trend in prices continued 
along with the diffusion of mass production  is certainly consistent with this 
explanation,  but it is not clear how  closely  synchronized the two processes 
were.25  It would also be interesting to see whether the steep and sustained drop 
in prices experienced by the automobile industry over more than three decades 
is typical of new industries along their trajectory toward maturity or whether 
it was unique. 
25. Nor can it be at this time. Surprisingly little is actually known about the diffusion of these 
methods on the firm and establishment levels. See Raff (1991 ) and Bresnahan and Raff (1993) for 
a start. 88  Daniel M. G. Raff and Manuel Trajtenberg 
Table 2.8  Rates of Change of Automobile Prices: Subperiods 
Subperiod  Rate of Change 
%AQAPrice 
1906-1 8  -0.22 
19 18-22  0.06 
1922-30  -0.13 
1930-40  0.01 
1906-40  -0.10 
96AQuality 
1906-14  0.17 
1914-24  -0.01 
1924-32  0.12 
1932-40  -0.11 
1906-40  0.04 
2.5.3 
Price changes averaged over the entire period conceal significant and inter- 
esting differences across subperiods. In this section we present the bare facts. 
We leave for future work detailed examination and explanation of the differ- 
ences. 
As table 2.8 reveals, one can clearly distinguish four periods in terms of 
%AQAPrice and %AQuality. Note that the partition is not exactly the same for 
the two measures. Most of the innovation appears to have occurred very early 
on (i.e.,  1906 through either 1914 or  1918, depending on which series one 
uses). Moreover, the highest rates of quality change occurred at the very begin- 
ning (1906-14).  This is undoubtedly the portion of  our period in which the 
greatest proportion of entrepreneurs were engineers or mechanics by training, 
knowledge spillovers were all-pervasive, and design bureaucracies were shal- 
lowest. Whatever the mechanisms  may  have been, the pattern lends further 
support to the conjecture that it is indeed in the course of the emergence of a 
new industry that the largest strides in product innovation are made.26  An im- 
portant implication of this is that if one leaves out those early stages in comput- 
ing quality-adjusted price indexes, one is bound to grossly underestimate the 
welfare effects of product innovation. 
In order to gain some perspective on the observed rate of innovation in cars 
during the initial period, it is worth comparing it to the rate in what might be 
regarded as the parallel period for personal computers, namely  1982-88. As 
reported in Berndt and Griliches (1993), the average rate of quality-adjusted 
price  decline in  that  industry  during  that  period  was  somewhere between 
-0.20  and -0.30  percent per year (depending on the sort of estimate used). 
For cars, our results show a figure of about half that size (-0.11  percent per 
Quality-Adjusted Price Changes over Subperiods 
26. Trajtenberg (1990) documents this pattern for the case of  computerized tomography (CT) 
scanners. 89  Quality-Adjusted Automobile Prices 
year for 1906-18,  -0.14  percent per year for 1906-14). This is quite remark- 
able considering that the case of  personal  computers is widely regarded  as 
extreme in its rate of  real-price decline. The decline for personal computers 
derived primarily from a long and steady series of dramatic improvements in 
integrated circuit-in  particular, microprocessor-design  and manufacturing 
capabilities. No major automobile component experienced such sustained dra- 
matic price/performance declinesz7  Yet the entire choice spectrum of cars dis- 
played 11-14  percent yearly rates of quality-adjusted price drops for roughly 
a decade! 
The biggest discrepancy between the picture presented by %AQAPrice and 
that by %AQuality is in the period 1914-18.  During those years prices came 
down steeply, but measured quality  stagnated or even worsened a little. As 
already mentioned, those years saw a substantial downsizing of  cars. In the 
context of hedonic measurement, this registers as quality decline. A  similar 
phenomenon happened in 1936, when a significant price drop (of over 20 per- 
cent) was more than offset by  downsizing, resulting in a measured quality- 
change residual of  -21  percent.28  However, it is doubtful that the reduction in 
the mean of some of the measured attributes during those episodes corresponds 
to welfare loses of the magnitude suggested by the hedonic computations. We 
discuss why this is so in section 2.6 below. 
Another interesting fact to notice is the dramatic changes from period to 
period and the cyclical pattern that they follow. This could in principle be a 
manifestation  of  economies of  scale in production or of  competition in the 
product market driving profit margins. This too is a finding in want of further 
research and interpretation. 
2.5.4.  A Longer Horizon 
It is natural to want to place the main findings of this section in the context 
of  a more extended history of the industry. The obvious way to do this is to 
link the appropriate series of  our data to the recent series of  Gordon (1990), 
which runs from just after the war through the early  1980s. Since Gordon’s 
series also derives from unweighted regressions, it is in fact appropriate to link 
the two dire~tly.~~  The linking can be accomplished using numbers relating 
1937 and 1950 cross sections from Griliches (1961). Table 2.9 gives the com- 
bined series.’O Figure 2.3 illustrates. 
It would be in the spirit of the literature to give a detailed interpretation to 
27. T.  L. De Fazio, Charles Stark Draper Laboratories, Cambridge, Mass., personal communi- 
cation. 
28. This happened again after 1975 (Gordon 1990). In that instance, the improvement in fuel 
economy offset the estimated value of the decline in size. It is unfortunate that no broadly based 
data on model fuel economy exists for the period studied in this paper. 
29. His regressions do not incorporate our systems approach, but much of the explanatory power 
in both is carried by the common variables. 
30. The break in the series is ultimately due to the cessation of automobile production during 
World War 11. 90  Daniel M. G. Raff and Manuel Trajtenberg 
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Table 2.9  Combined Hedonic Price Index 



















































































1970  53.9 
1971  57.8 
1972  55.6 
1973  54.5 
1974  58.4 
1975  68.5 
1976  72.0 
1977  74.3 
1978  85.4 
1979  88.9 
1980  99.2 
1981  124.9 
1982  135.3 
1983  140.8 
Nore: The coefficient on the variable D  in table 4 of Griliches (1961) was used to splice the third 
column of our table 2.5 and column 6 of table 8.8 in Gordon (1990). 
this figure. But the underlying  series are in terms of  current prices and the 
radical changes in the general price level that occurred over this extended pe- 
riod suggest deflating by the CPI first. This yields the series illustrated in figure 
2.4.  The explosion  at the  end  of  the  series in figure  2.3-proportionately 
roughly as large as the declines of the early years-is  revealed to be for practi- 
cal purposes entirely due to inflation. The overwhelming bulk of the quality- 
adjusted price decline in this industry came in a tremendous burst before the 91  Quality-Adjusted Automobile Prices 
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1910  1920  1930  1940  1950  1960  1970  1980 
Fig. 2.4  Quality-adjusted  price index 1906-1982  deflated by the Consumer 
Price Index (1906=100) 
1920s. By the time the Depression was over, so was most of the story. Compu- 
tations of growth rates averaged out over very long intervals can indeed miss 
the most salient details. 
2.6  Potential Biases 
The fact that our estimates are based on unweighted hedonic regressions 
may introduce biases in the quality-adjusted price indexes, primarily in those 
subperiods that experienced pronounced shifts in the structure of the market. 
The main concern is that our indexes may understate the extent of the real price 
reduction associated with the introduction and diffusion of mass-production 
methods and the concomitant  ascendancy of  low-end  models, primarily the 
Ford Model T. The issues here are interesting and worth exploring. 
There are two intertwined but nevertheless distinct aspects to the Model T 
phenomenon. First, true mass-production methods were deployed in manufac- 
turing it. These methods allowed Ford to realize vast economies of  scale and 
concomitant cost savings which emerged in substantial part as steep price re- 
ductions. The low prices sustained the mass market. Second, the Model T was 
a smaller, simpler, less powerful, and less luxurious car than virtually any other 
car of its time. These two aspects are intimately connected. 
It is quite clear that if the Model T had been produced with the craft methods 
that were prevalent in the industry at the time, its price would have been much 
higher. In fact, hedonic regressions including a dummy variable for Ford in the 
early period  show large negative  coefficients  on the dummy, in some years 
amounting to a price discount of 40 percent. That is, the Ford Model T was 92  Daniel M. G. Raff and Manuel Trajtenberg 
radically cheaper than what was warranted by the mere fact that it was smaller, 
simpler, and less powerful than other cars in the market. This was the force of 
mass production. 
On the other hand, it seems equally clear that introducing mass-production 
methods in manufacturing the higher-end models of  the time, even if it had 
been  technologically feasible, would  have not rendered  cars nearly  as low- 
priced as they needed to be to hit the more elastic segments of demand. In fact, 
the mass market revealed itself only as the price dropped to about $500, about 
one-sixth of  the mean price of  cars in preceding  years.  In  other words, the 
adoption of mass-production methods could be justified only if one could pro- 
duce in very large quantities, and such cars could find a market only if  they 
were  to  be  very  cheap.  This,  in  turn,  necessitated  the  design  of  a  small, 
stripped-to-the-bone  type of  car. Similarly, as the  mass-production methods 
spread to other manufacturers, they were applied first (and, for quite a while, 
only) to cars at the low end or, more precisely, to small, simple cars designed 
specifically with these demand and production relationships in mind. 
What are the implications of these facts for the construction (and interpreta- 
tion) of our price indexes? There are two, one related to the fact that we do not 
have quantity data, the other to the inherent limitations of the hedonic methods 
in these circumstances. We discuss them sequentially in the remainder of this 
section. 
2.6.1  Lack of Quantity Data: Biases and Remedies 
Our lack of detailed quantity data, which obliges us to base our calculations 
on nothing more complex than unweighted hedonic regressions, might cause a 
serious  underestimate  of  the  price  fall  that  took  place  as  mass-production 
methods were introduced and the Ford Model T captured a large share of the 
total market. One can think of this as a sampling problem. As the market com- 
position shifted dramatically toward the low end, we keep sampling according 
to the old frame of reference in which all models received their initial-implic- 
itly, equal-weights.  How big a problem is this? To assess the extent of the 
bias, we bring in two additional sets of numbers. These are a separate index for 
Ford cars alone, which we have calculated for this purpose, and the automobile 
component  of  the  Producer  Price  Index  (PPI) of  the  period,  a component 
which is based primarily on mass-produced cars. 
The simplest way to assess the extent of the bias without resorting to unavail- 
able broadly based quantity data is to take the lowest-priced Ford as a reason- 
able proxy for the mass-market car of each year, create a quality-adjusted price 
index for Ford, and observe how it compares to our QAPrice index. Figure 2.5 
does this. It was convenient to start the Ford series with a figure for 1910, so 
the comparison runs from 1910 to 1940. 
It is important to note that Ford sold just one basic design, with only minor 
variations,  from the beginning of  the period shown here through  1927. The 
first epoch in the Ford series is a long decline, punctuated only by a spike in 93  Quality-Adjusted Automobile Prices 
1910  1920  1930  1940 
+++-  Ford QAPrice  t  All Models QAPrice 
Fig. 2.5  Ford quality-adjusted price versus all models quality-adjusted price 
(1910=100) 
the immediate postwar years which represents the sharp but transitory postwar 
inflation, the company’s financial crisis, and its desperate-if  in the end quite 
effective-measures  to avoid in~olvency.~’  During this decade and a half, Ford 
cars were produced  with  unusually  capital-intensive methods.32 Output  ex- 
ploded and economies of scale were exploited relentlessly. By 1926, the design 
was unchanged but the market was not. It was in this period that Ford acquired, 
for the first time, serious competition  for the low end of  the market.33 The 
Model T clearly needed to be replaced, and the late  1920s at Ford were the 
epoch of the more sophisticated Model A. Production ramped  up and costs 
fell,  albeit  more  slowly  than  before.  By  the  mid-l930s, bolstered  by  the 
Depression-induced  shakeout  of  smaller-scale producers,  all three  low-end 
makes were moving upmarket in attribute space, and the final series of Ford 
numbers reflects this. 
Figure 2.5 faithfully depicts these developments. We can see that the diver- 
gence between the unweighted  series and Ford’s starts in 1918 and goes on 
until 1930, with Ford’s showing-as  expected-a  lower index. But it is in the 
mid- 1920s that the difference becomes very pronounced, with the Ford index 
reaching a low of less than one-half the level of the unweighted index in 1922- 
24. The mechanics of this are quite simple. Our unweighted index converges 
back toward its 1916 level quite slowly from the postwar inflation spike. The 
Ford  series, by contrast, positively  vaults  back onto the track of  the  scale- 
3  1. On the company’s postwar troubles, see Nevins and Hill (1957). 
32. In the 1920s the Ford mother plant was often said to be the largest single industrial establish- 
33. This came from General Motors’ Chevrolet (circa 1924) and Chrysler’s Plymouth (1928). 
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Fig. 2.6  Producer Price Index cars component versus quality-adjusted price 
1914-1930  (1914=100) 
driven economies. It comes back up mid-decade  as consumer tastes  shifted 
toward the less spartan models the rest of the manufacturers were by then mak- 
ing. Two points thus emerge. First, it is when the market is experiencing dra- 
matic changes in the composition of its output that the lack of quantity data 
proves  most  awkward  for the  hedonic  method.  Second, however,  the  un- 
weighted index tells quite an accurate story over the long run of our period. 
Figure 2.6 presents a similar comparison, but this time with the automobile 
component of  the  PPI. This was quantity-weighted  average of  the prices  of 
specific models of six manufacturers, representing the broad sweep of the mar- 
ket.’4  This  is  in  effect  a  selective  quantity-weighted  index uncorrected  for 
changes in quality. The most important feature of  the figure is that the two 
series have the same broad qualitative features. But contrary to Gordon’s find- 
ings for the post-World  War  I1 period, there is no trending bias to the PPI 
component here. The relative positions of our index and the PPI series change 
as downsizing or quality-enhancement in the ordinary sense dominate. In this, 
our index is surely superior. The figure also shows our index to be off in peri- 
ods of market composition  change. This is just what we observed with the 
Ford series. 
2.6.2  Potential Biases due to Downsizing 
The second potential  source of bias  stems from the other aspect of  mass 
production, namely that it involved manufacturing low-end cars. In fact, from 
34. The manufacturers were Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Dodge, Ford, and Packard. See, e.g., 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1929, 2 and table 9). 95  Quality-Adjusted Automobile Prices 
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Fig. 2.7  Downsizing bias 
the middle of the second decade of the twentieth century to the middle of the 
third, there was a pronounced downsizing trend in the mix of models offered 
in the market, with a concomitant reduction in prices. (A second downsizing 
wave, less pronounced,  occurred in the late 1930s.) As we have remarked,  it 
remains to be established how precisely this relates to the advent of mass pro- 
duction  since Ford alone introduced  those methods to begin with and Ford 
models constituted only a tiny fraction of the population of models. Clearly, 
these issues can be properly dealt with if and only if extensive quantity data 
become available. 
But the problem in this context is that the hedonic method cannot (and was 
never meant to) assess the trade-offs in utility between a reduction in measur- 
able quality (for example, HP) and the price reduction. All it can do is tell 
whether  the prices  fell on average more  or less than what the reduction  in 
quality would have warranted and translate that measure into a price index. Is 
such an index an accurate representation of the underlying changes in consum- 
ers’ welfare as a consequence of  the introduction  of low-end cars? Without 
more information it is impossible to say, but there is good reason to suspect not. 
Consider the hypothetical situation depicted in figure 2.7. Price is measured 
on the vertical axis (P), a positively valued attribute such as HP on the hori- 
zontal (Z). In the base period, the hedonic function is the solid line p(z).  The 
indifference curve u-u  represents consumers who buy the lowest quality-price 
combination but are not “satisfied”: satisfaction requires tangency between the 
indifference curve and the hedonic surface. (Compare their situation with that 
of  the consumers represented by the indifference curve  v-v.)  In the second 
period, new low-end models appear. As a consequence, the u-u  type of  con- 
sumers  can attain a higher utility  level,  ut-ut. A hedonic  quality-adjusted 96  Daniel M. G. Raff and Manuel Trajtenberg 
price index might  decrease  somewhat, show no change  at all (as shown in 
figure 2.6), or even increase. In any case, it will be biased upward: the distance 
between u-u  and ur-u', which is a rough approximation for the welfare gain 
associated with the change, will always exceed the distance between the old 
and new hedonic curves. Indeed, the overall bias may be very large if consum- 
ers of the u-u  type make up a large fraction of the market. This seems likely 
to have been the case in the late part of  the  second decade of  the twentieth 
century and the first half of  the third decade. Without quantity data and the 
more demanding computational methods, however, we cannot assess the mag- 
nitude of the bias. We can only identify the periods in which this bias is likely 
to occur and interpret hedonic-based results for those periods as lower bounds 
for the true quality-adjusted price reductions. 
2.7  Conclusion 
Most of the change in quality-adjusted prices (based on CPI-deflated prices) 
of American automobiles between  1906 and 1983 occurred during the period 
studied in this paper. Between the years 1906 and 1940, quality-adjusted prices 
fell at an average rate of 5 percent per year, thus halving every thirteen years. 
That is a very brisk pace. In the first eight to twelve years of  the period, the 
pace was even brisker, about one-half the size of the best recent estimates for 
the personal computer industry. We find this one-half an intriguingly high frac- 
tion for an industry that in its time wrought equally radical changes on society 
and on the feasibility of other innoations. Methodological reflections suggest 
that the true fraction may be even higher. 
Our measured decline can be divided  into price and quality components. 
Prices themselves (CPI-deflated) dropped at a rate of 3 percent, whereas qual- 
ity as we measure it increased at a rate of 2 percent per year. This suggests that 
60 percent of the decline in quality-adjusted prices was due to process innova- 
tion and only 40 percent to product innovation or quality change per se. 
One innovation  of this  study  was to  include much more detail about the 
mechanical aspects of the vehicles in the regressors. Regression results, some 
reported here and some not, indicate that inclusion of systems variables does 
make a difference. For the most part, however, the difference is a small one 
(about 1 percentage point in the computation of %AQAPrice).  This may grow 
larger as researchers'  sophistication about engineering issues grows. 
These estimates all derive from unweighted regressions. Comparisons of the 
unweighted index with an index derived from low-end Ford models, a reason- 
able proxy throughout the period for the  mass market,  reveals  a significant 
divergence for a brief (transitional) period but otherwise fairly thoroughgoing 
conformity. Thus long- and even medium-term measures of the sort discussed 
above would be unaffected  by  the choice of index. Comparison of  our index 
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Fig. 2A.1  Rear axle designs 1910-1940 
for quality change reinforces this point and also underlines the importance of 
correcting for quality. 
This paper is a first quantitative glimpse into one of the most dynamic and 
interesting periods in the history  of modem industrial sectors. A number of 
substantive questions clearly worthy of further research have emerged. Pursu- 
ing most of them would require a database incorporating quantity data. More 
light may thus be shed in future work. 
Appendix 
The Evolution of System Designs 
Figure 2A. 1 shows the initial division of rear axle designs between the floating 
and the lighter and cheaper half- (or semi-) floating design. The main design 
issue here is how the weight of the car is distributed over the axle.35  Initially, 
the semifloating approach lost ground to the fully floating, presumably as it 
became clear that contemporary single bearings were inadequate to carry the 
loads  and  stresses  involved. As  incremental  innovations  in  bearing  design 
emerged,  the proportion  of  semi- and three-quarters-floating designs in the 
population grew at the fully floating’s expense; finally the bearing innovations 
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seem to have been perfected, the half-floating design itself was perfected, and 
it essentially drove the others out of the population entirely. 
The population of clutch types is displayed in figure 2A.2. There were ini- 
tially a number of competing approaches (and in principle a number of variants 
of each). The cone design was familiar to machinists and in that sense accessi- 
ble. But the mechanism needed regular cleaning and adjustment, engagement 
was abrupt, and the heaviness of the mechanism made gear changing difficult. 
The plate family did not have these problems.  Initially, inadequacies  of the 
facing materials made single-plate clutches inappropriate for relatively heavy 
cars. The decline of the multiplate percentage in the 1930s may well represent 
the declining  percentage  of  heavy  automobiles.  Improved  facing materials 
probably also play some role. 
Figure 2A.3, badly afflicted with missing data, shows a similar sort of rise 
and fall. Hydraulic brake systems were at first expensive relative to mechanical 
ones. (There were also engineering reasons for wanting some of the tubing to 
be flexible and suspicions about the tubing’s integrity persisted for some time.) 
Relative cost may account for the relative decline in hydraulic systems’ inci- 
dence in the early Depression years. But they were almost completely domi- 
nant by the end of the decade. 
Drive types are the subject of figure 2A.4.  This variable concerns the means 
by which power was transmitted to the rear axle. Chain drives were mechani- 
cally  simple  and  common in  the  very  earliest  cars. They  contributed  to a 
smooth ride since they involved a relatively high ratio of  sprung to unsprung 1930  1940  -  Hydraulic  +  Mechanical  1 
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weight. But they were also noisy and potentially dangerous. They did not last 
in the population. Ordinary bevel gears had fewer of these faults but were still 
noisy relative to spiral-beveled gears. The spiral-bevel design emerged as the 
most desirable for a time but was eventually eclipsed by  another innovation, 
hypoid gearing, that maintained the advantages of the spiral bevel and allowed 
the driveshaft to be lowered relative to the body. 
Figure 2A.5 shows population percentages for types of springs. The trans- 
verse design seems to have been effective only for extremely  light vehicles. 
The competition among the other designs for most of our period is best under- 
stood as being between the fully elliptic on the one hand and the half-elliptic 
family on the other.36  The latter group included the half-elliptic design, the 
cantilever (a half-elliptic mounted in a slightly different fashion and requiring 
additional metal parts to constrain the axle), and the platform design (a more 
complex and heavier variant with no performance advantages). The issue be- 
tween the full- and half-elliptics concerned how high above the axle the chassis 
and body had to sit. Presumably due to some combination of improving roads, 
evolving fashions in body styles, and the desire to take weight out of designs 
(so as to increase acceleration, improve fuel economy, etc.), the half-elliptic 
family and the half-elliptic design within it won out. In the graph, one again 
observes initial heterogeneity  and the emergence of a dominant design. 
36. Toward the end of our period one first begins to see the coil springs that were related to the 
development of  independent front suspension. 101  Quality-Adjusted Automobile Prices 
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Comment  Jack E. Triplett 
Technical change can, it is well known, alter the production process or it can 
alter the characteristics of the product. Raff and Trajtenberg appropriately and 
imaginatively employ the hedonic method to explore and illuminate product- 
oriented technical change in automobiles from 1906 to 1940. 
The economics of differentiated products concerns the production, sale, pur- 
chase, and use of the bundle of characteristics that are embodied in the product. 
An empirical hedonic function provides estimates of the prices of the charac- 
teristics in the bundle, and also helps, with a priori knowledge, to isolate em- 
pirically the characteristics. Because the hedonic function is determined by the 
technology  of  producing characteristics and by  buyers’ preferences for them 
(Rosen 1974),  hedonic prices will be influenced in a predictable way by techni- 
cal change. 
The automobile hedonic model employed by  Raff and Trajtenberg derives 
from Court (1939) and Griliches (1961), and is fundamentally the same as that 
in  studies  such as Gordon (1990), Ohta and Griliches (1976),  and my  own 
earlier work on automobiles (Triplett 1969). The hedonic functions for auto- 
mobiles in this literature are primitive in many ways. They portray the com- 
plexities of automobile production or use solely through measures of carrying 
capacity and engine performance, plus the presence or absence of a small num- 
ber of amenities. The simple automobile hedonic model is undoubtedly a better 
description of automobile technology in the historical period covered by Raff 
and Trajtenberg than it would be far more recent periods-the  automobile is 
far more complex now, and what consumers want and expect from it is much 
harder to model in 1995 than in, say, 1910.’ 
Nevertheless, the simple automobile hedonic model’s shortcomings need to 
be kept in mind in interpreting automobile hedonic measures for any period. 
My comments on this simple automobile hedonic model represent not so much 
disagreement with the reservations Raff and Trajtenberg have expressed about 
it  (I endorse their useful discussion  of  engineering  complexity)  but,  rather, 
differing empirical points of emphasis. 
The major reservation  concerns the variables in automobile hedonic func- 
tions. The entire theoretical literature on consumer price indexes rests on the 
implicit assumption that the consumption quantities that appear in index num- 
Jack E. Triplett is chief economist at the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S.  Department 
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exist for constructing quality-adjusted automobile price indexes. For the 1906-40  historical pe- 
riod. the same alternatives to hedonic methods do not exist. 
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ber formulas are arguments of the consumer’s utility function. It is sometimes 
overlooked that hedonic price indexes for consumer goods are based on exactly 
the same assumption: The characteristics in properly specified hedonic func- 
tions are consumption quantities that generate utility; they are arguments of a 
utility function that is defined on characteristics, rather than simply on goods 
(see Rosen 1974 for elaboration of this point with respect to hedonic functions, 
and Triplett 1983, 1987 for its application to hedonic price indexes). 
One cannot  emphasize too strongly  that  the  simple automobile hedonic 
model incorporates only the roughest kinds of proxies for the true automotive 
services that consumers desire. Carrying capacity and performance-the  ma- 
jor variables in the simple automobile hedonic model-provide  an inadequate 
representation of  what the automobile does for its buyer, and therefore also 
of  what automobile companies and engineers design and produce. Obvious 
omissions are braking and safety characteristics, as well as comfort and other 
characteristics of luxuriousness. Yet, even capacity and performance character- 
istics are described very inadequately by the technical specifications that have 
been published in industry sources. 
The best simple measure of passenger capacity is probably body space: the 
distance between the car’s engine and its rear axle. This is a standard chassis 
dimension that is used within the industry for body-manufacturing  purposes 
but seldom appears in industry publications. Tables of interior dimensions ap- 
pear at least as early as 1928 (Motor 1928), yet wheelbase and overall length 
have been, since Court (1939), the primary  measures of  size in automobile 
hedonic functions, partly because they are consistently measured over the years 
and appear in most published compilations of automobile specifications. 
Speed and acceleration are desired automobile performance characteristics. 
They were especially important in the 1906-40  period explored by Raff and 
Traj  tenberg because performance was lower then and increments to perfor- 
mance much more expensive. The engine measure that is most closely related 
to automobile performance is torque (a measure of engine twisting power), 
not the horsepower the engine develops. However, torque is almost never pub- 
lished in statistical compilations before  1940, and even horsepower data are 
fragmentary for much of the period.2 For most years, we have instead the cylin- 
der capacity (displacement) of the engine and its “rated’  hor~epower.~  Neither 
one is adequate for describing the trend of engine performance over time be- 
cause actual  power  rose  steadily  relative  to both engine displacement and 
rated horsepower. 
2. The compilation in Naul(1978) presents, from unspecific original sources, actual horsepower 
for many U.S. automobile engines back to 1920. For some cars, however, data are incomplete or 
missing entirely. 
3. Rated, or “taxable,” horsepower was computed according to a formula that considered only 
cylinder bore. The formula was developed early in the century but was rapidly made obsolete by 
developments in engine design. In Great Britain, rated horsepower was used for taxation purposes. 
A table in Moror (1928) presents displacement, rated horsepower, and actual horsepower for most 
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Beyond mere size and engine performance, a host of characteristics gener- 
ates utility to the consumer of automobile services. From this perspective, it is 
difficult  to understand  why publishers  selected the particular measures that 
appear in industry  source^.^ A few of the variables commonly tabulated (e.g.. 
type of  lubrication system, type of  valves, and number of  forward speeds in 
the transmission) have implications for some property that is important to the 
buyer (engine reliability, engine efficiency, and driving flexibility and perfor- 
mance, respectively, in the three examples cited) as well as for cost of produc- 
tion. A few others have implications for maintenance; a detachable cylinder 
head, for example, makes it far easier to grind the valves, a routine mainte- 
nance required at frequent intervals in the 1920s and 1930s, though the nonde- 
tachable head avoids all problems with  cylinder head gaskets, which in the 
earlier years of the automobile’s history were a source of mechanical failure. 
No direct statistics in the published data sources measure speed and acceler- 
ation, handling ease, cornering ability, reliability, smoothness of engine, con- 
trols, and  ride, and so forth. The substantial technical  innovations  to auto- 
mobile engines, brakes, transmissions, and bodies in the  1930s, for example, 
vastly improved the quality of  the end-of-decade car compared with the one 
that had been available at the beginning of  the decade. All of these changes 
are more or less ignored in the simple automobile hedonic model, for lack of 
published  specifications on consumer-oriented  characteristics. Similar state- 
ments can be made about data for earlier decades in the automobile’s history. 
One can also, it is well known (see Rosen 1974), interpret the independent 
variables  in  hedonic  functions  as  outputs  of  automobile  producers,  which 
means they are arguments in producers’ cost functions. But the published auto- 
mobile specifications are also not very closely related to technical changes that 
engineering  departments  of  automobile  companies  were working  on at the 
time. Ohta and Griliches (1976) make the valid distinction between what they 
call technical characteristics and performance  characteristics. Unfortunately, 
the specifications that are published on automobiles are related-a  little bit- 
to both, but do not correspond very well to either. What we have, at best, are 
variables that are rough proxies for the true characteristics that in a hedonic 
model are the outputs of producers and the arguments in buyers’ utility func- 
tions. 
The most one can say about the simple automobile hedonic model is (a) one 
hopes that the variables included in the regressions are functions of the true 
arguments of  consumers’ utility functions and producers’  cost functions and 
(b) one hopes additionally that the function that relates the regression variables 
to the true Characteristics is a stable one.s If the variables that are put into the 
4.  Examples of  such sources are the National Automobile Chamber of  Commerce  ([  19251 
1970) and Motor (1928). 
5.  This is not a new point. This proxy variable problem was noted in the original hedonic auto- 
mobile article by Court (1939). and by Griliches (1961). and it was emphasized in Triplett (1969), 
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hedonic model-or  for that matter, into the more general welfare model that 
Trajtenberg ( 1990) and others have discussed-are  not the true characteristics 
that enter the utility function, or the outputs that define the characteristics- 
space cost function, empirical results  will  be misleading.  The true  utility- 
generating characteristics and the proxy measures incorporated into empirical 
hedonic functions may move differently over some periods. 
This is not merely a call for better data and more research, though it is that. 
It has potentially serious implications for the interpretation of the work that 
has been done so far. Consider Raff and Trajtenberg’s discussion of what they 
call “downsizing” of automobiles in the 1930s. Adoption of independent front 
suspension  systems was the major innovation in automobile suspensions in 
that decade. In a sense, independent front suspensions are like the other inno- 
vations that are omitted from the simple automobile hedonic model: We have 
no adequate measures of the ride and handling improvements wrought by inno- 
vations in suspension design, and accordingly the hedonic measures miss some 
of the quality improvement that we would like them to measure. But there also 
was an indirect effect: The independent front suspension permitted moving the 
engine forward in the body frame, which meant there was more body space 
available than before for a given wheelbase size. Some designers took advan- 
tage of the changed body space-wheelbase  ratio to increase passenger space, 
while others reduced the wheelbase, leaving passenger space unchanged. What 
the published automobile specifications show is a decline in average wheel- 
base, which one might incorrectly interpret as downsizing. But a good part of 
the wheelbase decline was not matched by a decline in the average usable car- 
rying capacity of the car. Quite the contrary: a typical car after the introduction 
of the independent front suspension was more roomy inside, not less roomy. 
Similar comments can be made of other periods of apparent downsizing of 
automobiles. The downsizing period in the U.S. industry in the late 1970s, 
mentioned by Raff and Trajtenberg in their discussion of the study by Gordon 
(1990), was striking in that it represented a substantial reduction in the ratio 
of  external to internal automobile volume. U.S. cars within every size class 
were made smaller on the outside without shrinking the usable interior dimen- 
sions. And although I have not studied closely the 1915-18 downsizing period 
that Raff and Trajtenberg also mention, technical changes in this era reduced 
the size and weight of engines, especially, and made it possible to produce 
smaller-engined, lighter cars that gave their owners superior performance in 
use compared with the older, larger, and less-efficient designs. With the wheel- 
base and engine-displacement proxy variables used by Raff and Trajtenberg- 
and by all the rest of us-these  technical improvements will be mismeasured. 
Bias can also result from the use of either rated horsepower or cubic inches 
of  engine displacement as a measure of  automobile performance. Technical 
changes in the automobile engine continually raised actual developed horse- 
power relative to displacement and rated horsepower. A contemporary British 
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of the 1930s with the Bentley 3-liter model that was introduced at the begin- 
ning of  the preceding  decade (both model designations referred  to the dis- 
placement of  the car's engine). The substantial improvement in performance 
might have been expected, roughly, from the substantial increase in actual de- 
veloped horsepower  (approximately  110-120  for the later car, compared  to 
approximately 65-70  for the earlier one), but it could not have been predicted 
from  the  relatively  modest  half-liter  change  in  cylinder  displacement.  The 
Bentley was by  no means unique. Increased engine performance  relative to 
engine size was typical, not unusual, in U.S. cars as well as in those in the 
United Kingdom. 
The examples suggest that hedonic price indexes are upwardly  biased be- 
cause of this proxy variable problem (i.e., they do not pick up enough of the 
quality changes that have occurred in cars).  Empirically,  upward-bias  cases 
probably predominate in automobile hedonic studies, but that is not necessar- 
ily always the case. The difficulty is not that our proxy measures are biased in 
a known direction; rather, they are unreliable, so the sign of bias is not always 
known a priori. For complex products like the automobile, we need better data 
on characteristics, data that more nearly match the requirements of the theory 
of hedonic functions and hedonic indexes. 
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